Some courts, on the state and federal level, have implemented rules for appointing counsel in habeas corpus petitions, which allow petitioners in state or federal custody to challenge the validity of their detention. But these rules are inconsistent and differ greatly, leading to petitioners having no knowledge of whether or not counsel will actually be appointed, or whether appointed counsel is prepared to provide adequate representation.

However, because local rules of the federal district courts can be changed relatively easily, judges have an opportunity to adopt favorable appointment mechanisms without much difficulty. This article looks at the Pennsylvania state rules and the local rules of several district courts, with the local rules of each court serving as individual “cases,” to determine just how effective the mechanisms of appointment are, and in doing so, makes recommendations as to what rules courts should adopt to ensure more effective appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings.

Chief Justice Taney’s 1857 opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford is justly infamous for its holdings that African Americans could never be citizens, that Congress was powerless to prohibit slavery in the territories, and for its proclamation that persons of African ancestry “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” For all of the interest in and attention to Dred Scott, however, no scholar has previously analyzed United States v. Dow, an 1840 decision of Chief Justice Taney in a circuit court trial which is apparently the first federal decision to articulate a broad theoretical basis for white supremacy. Dow identified whites as the “master” race, and the opinion explained that only those of European origin were either welcomed or allowed to be members of the political community in the American colonies. Non-whites such as members of Dow’s race, Taney explained, could be reduced to slavery, and therefore their rights continued to be subject to absolute legislative discretion. Dow, however, was not a person of African descent—he was Malay, from the Philippines. Chief Justice Taney’s employment in Dow of legal reasoning which he would later apply in Dred Scott suggests that Dred Scott should be regarded as pertinent to all people of color, not only African Americans.

In Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney justified denying free Blacks the right to sue in diversity in federal courts on the ground that no Black, whether slave or free, could ever be a citizen of the United States. He asserted that at the Founding, free Blacks were not citizens of the nation and that they could never be incorporated into the American polity. He infamously asserted that at the Founding, Blacks were “so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.” Taney was fundamentally wrong in these claims, and he should have known as much. In the last three decades of the eighteenth century, Americans actually witnessed a dramatic revolution in race relations, leading to the first civil rights laws in U.S. history. While some states retreated from this period of expanded civil rights in the nineteenth century, others did not.

This Essay primarily addresses two points, raised by Professor Gabriel J. Chin in his Article, Dred Scott and Asian Americans: first, Chief Justice Roger Taney as a proponent and defender of interconnected, even intersectional, racial ideologies; and second, Taney’s representativeness as an historian and as a legal realist describing law and politics as they were. In Professor Chin’s first claim, about the interconnected nature of Taney’s racial thought, we find a fascinating insight into the construction of a predominantly Democratic vision of the white race that helped shape not only Taney’s jurisprudence, but also his party’s efforts to develop a constructed identity politics. Professor Chin’s focus on the Naturalization Act of 1790 is a powerful rejoinder to many early U.S. historical narratives that examine race making solely with regard to people already in what became the United States. Taney’s arguments about a white Christian master race in turn help center nonwhiteness, not just Blackness or indigeneity, in early U.S. history with profound consequences. These are major claims and major contributions.

This commentary considers Professor Jack Chin’s analysis in his Article, Dred Scott and Asian Americans, of the white supremacist underpinnings and modern legacy of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney’s decisions in United States v. Dow, a little-known decision denying full citizenship rights to Asian Americans, and Dred Scott v. Sandford, an iconic Supreme Court decision that rejected full citizenship to a freed Black man and precipitated the Civil War. It further explores how Chief Justice Taney’s analysis of race and racial subordination in the nineteenth century exemplifies the fundamental tenet of modern Critical Race Theory that the law operates to enforce and maintain white supremacy.

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”) represents a historic achievement for the global disability rights movement. Yet, when the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it on December 4, 2012, its influence on American law and policy seemed doomed. The Founders, after all, had conceived of a constitutional vision—“dual federalism”—where the federal government acts as the ultimate arbiter of questions of international policy. But dual federalism has not endured. Cities, counties, and states have become key decision-makers in areas once dominated by the federal government, and they have also become champions of the CRPD. This Article explains that “foreign affairs federalism” is at the heart of this paradigm shift. This new status quo reveals that the Constitution leaves ample room for subnational entities to engage on issues of international scale.

This Article argues that a functional approach to family law—treating those who have acted like family as family—undermines principles of family privacy and autonomy, and ultimately may not secure equal treatment for certain families within communities of color and and LGBTQ communities. In doing so, this Article challenges not only the functional turn in family law, but feminist scholarship that has been critical of family autonomy and privacy doctrine. Building on the consistent defense of privacy that emanates from women scholars of color, Professor Katharine K. Baker demonstrates how functional analyses demand interference and judgement that is likely to tear at the fabric of minority communities.

This Article provides the results of an empirical survey (nearly 200 currently sitting U.S. judges) of judicial thought on legal prediction, and it uses these results, along with an analysis of legal prediction cases in U.S. law, to argue that current legal scholarship has missed an important distinction in legal prediction problems: predicting up (What will the agent of a subsequent legal decision do? That is, what will the prosecutor decide? How will the court rule?) and predicting down (What will the object of the legal decision do? That is, will the defendant show up for court? Will he recidivate?). An example of a court predicting up is Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, where a lower court anticipated a shift in higher court thinking. An example of a court predicting down is Miller v. Alabama, where the Supreme Court limited life without parole sentences to only those juveniles who are considered “irreparably corrupt.” There are unique issues that inhere to these distinct classes of prediction problems, such as technological-legal lock-in, the need for lay connection to legal processes, and the risk of racial bias.

The “myth of voter fraud” poses a significant threat to American democracy by both disenfranchising large numbers of voters and by weakening the public’s faith in elections. Noting that about twenty-one states currently enforce strict voter ID requirements, and that many state legislatures are in the process of further restricting access to the polls, this Comment urges voting rights advocates to challenge voter ID laws in state court—and proposes potential pathways for doing so.

During the protests that followed George Floyd’s death at the hands of law enforcement in 2020, a number of journalists were arrested on the job. A series of journalists fired back with lawsuits, asserting that their constitutional rights were violated. Collectively referred to as the “Floyd Caselaw,” these cases present a compelling portrait as to the status of First Amendment rights in the United States, and hint at broader acceptance of judicially-recognized press rights.

Can a sitting President be indicted while in office? This critical constitutional question has never been directly answered by any court or legislative body. The prevailing wisdom, however, is that, though he may be investigated, a sitting President is immune from actual prosecution. This Article argues that the Trump v. Vance case suggests a sitting President can be investigated and indicted while in office.

Prof. Levine’s article suggests that, taken together, judicial rulings and rhetoric during the July 2020 religious gathering SCOTUS cases demonstrate that the “hands-off approach” to religious practice and belief cases remains, at once, both vibrant and vulnerable. These cases offer a poignant example of the difficulties the hands-off approach imposes on judges when the proper resolution of a case seems to require, at least in part, a measure of inquiry into the substantive doctrine underlying a religious practice.

The Senate’s system of self-governance has become so complex that it requires a full-time parliamentarian to prepare guidance. Senators generally adhere to the unwritten rules, but because they are not binding, they can be bent and broken. Greg Burton argues that this procedural looseness opens Senate proceedings to exploitation, rendering the proliferation of unwritten rules undesirable.

Prof. Turner observes that judicial review of guilty pleas in the virtual setting is as brief and superficial as it is in person, but the virtual format presents additional risks to the fairness and integrity of the process. She concludes that virtual pleas should be limited in the future, and in the extent they continue, states must implement robust procedural protections for defendants.

Over the years, the Court’s decisions have become more complex, making it difficult and time-consuming for anyone outside the professional elites to determine what the Court has held. Profs. Sullivan and Feldbrin argue that it would be beneficial for the Court to engage with the public and make its decisions more accessible.

Prof. Seidman, in his essay, attempts to defend the Rucho v. Common Cause decision. While acknowledging that this is not easy, he hopes that the reader will at least allow him some points for degree of difficulty. There is no denying that partisan gerrymandering is a very serious evil, and there is no defending Chief Justice Roberts’ dreadful opinion justifying the Court’s refusal to do anything about it. Still, Prof. Seidman argues, on balance, we are better off without the Supreme Court mucking around with this problem. Moreover, the reasons why we are better off go beyond this particular issue and impeach some of the standard arguments for judicial intervention more generally.

Prof. Simard argues in her article that when political questions arise, courts should treat, in most cases, them like every other dispute by relying upon traditional tools of adjudication to resolve the questions presented. When ordinary constitutional interpretation suggests there is no constitutional violation that is remediable by the courts, there is no need to invoke the political question doctrine because courts may rely upon traditional procedural safeguards that test the adequacy of a complaint—lack of standing or failure to state claim.

This Article challenges the premise Congress must take such a passive approach to judicial review, expressing policy preferences in seriatim fashion (and being “sent back to the drawing board” each time a policy fails). This approach merely reflects institutional habits. And by failing to question these habits, reformers forfeit an enormous amount of legislative power.

When President Trump was elected president, he held various domestic and international business interests and upon taking office was sued and it was claimed he was in violation of the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) was not consulted on the question of whether President Trump could continue to receive payments through his businesses as president. This article proposes that had the OLC been asked it would have concluded that the president was in violation of both clauses to the extent that any profits and payments received were sourced from government entities, whether foreign or domestic.

Prof. Araiza’s article takes a look at the tension between political branches trying to enact significant civil rights legislation and a skeptical Court wielding now-longstanding precedent limiting the enforcement power. This prospect raises important questions about the relationship between the Court and the political branches in the project of safeguarding individual rights.