Concretizing Abstract* Rights: Damages for Intangible Constitutional Injuries Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
Abigail Kasdin** | 26.2 | Citation: Abigail Kasdin, Concretizing Abstract* Rights: Damages for Intangible Constitutional Injuries Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 26 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 550 (2024).
On April 1st, 1997, Eric Oliver was arrested by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and detained at the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC). For the first two days of his detention, Oliver was locked in a 404 square foot cell with around fifty other detainees. On April 3rd, he was transferred to a smaller cell, only 174 square feet, where he was kept with eighteen other people. For the following three days, Oliver was locked in the cell with no bed and no linens. He and the other detainees slept on the floors with intense overhead lighting and extreme air conditioning that “chilled [him] to the bone.” Oliver requested medical attention for a back condition, but his request was denied. After his release from jail, Oliver filed a § 1983 action against the management, Clark County, and the Clark County Sheriff, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Since Oliver brought his suit in Nevada, his claim for compensatory damages survived a motion to dismiss, even though he was not able to demonstrate a physical injury. This was notable because § 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) creates a physical injury requirement for incarcerated people who bring § 1983 claims. However, if Oliver had lived in Philadelphia, New York, or a number of other cities across the country, his claim for compensatory damages would have been dismissed. These disparate outcomes would have been the result of the different ways courts interpret the physical injury requirement of the PLRA. In this particular instance, Oliver’s claim survived because he was in the Ninth Circuit. Claims in Philadelphia or New York would have been governed by the Third and Second Circuits, respectively, both of which have case law that would prevent the award of compensatory damages.
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* This title borrows the word “abstract” from the Supreme Court’s holding that the abstract value of constitutional rights cannot form the basis for compensatory damages in civil rights lawsuits. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (holding that “the abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages”).
** J.D. Candidate, 2024, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; B.A., 2018, Harvard University.